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object　of　History　in　a　more　definite　shape　than　before；　that　in　which　Freedom　obtains　objectivity；

and　lives　in　the　enjoyment　of　this　objectivity。　For　Law　is　the　objectivity　of　Spirit；　volition　in　its　true

form。　Only　that　will　which　obeys　law；　is　free；　for　it　obeys　itself　…　it　is　independent　and　so　free。

When　the　State　or　our　country　constitutes　a　munity　of　existence；　when　the　subjective　will　of

man　submits　to　laws；　…　the　contradiction　between　Liberty　and　Necessity　vanishes。　The　Rational

has　necessary　existence　as　being　the　reality　and　substance　of　things；　and　we　are　free　in　recognising

it　as　law；　and　following　it　as　the　substance　of　our　own　being。　The　objective　and　the　subjective　will

are　then　reconciled；　and　present　one　identical　homogeneous　whole。　For　the　morality　（Sittlichkeit）

of　the　State　is　not　of　that　ethical　（moralische）　reflective　kind；　in　which　ones　own　conviction　bears

sway；　this　latter　is　rather　the　peculiarity　of　the　modern　time；　orality　is　based

on　the　principle　of　abiding　by　ones　duty　＇to　the　state　at　large＇。　An　Athenian　citizen　did　what　was

required　of　him；　as　it　were　from　instinct；　but　if　I　reflect　on　the　object　of　nay　activity；　I　must　have

the　consciousness　that　my　will　has　been　called　into　exercise。　But　morality　is　Duty　…　substantial

Right　…　a　〃second　nature〃　as　it　has　been　justly　called；　for　the　first　nature　of　man　is　his　primary

merely　animal　existence。

§　42

The　development　in　extenso　of　the　Idea　of　the　State　belongs　to　the　Philosophy　of　Right；　but　it

must　be　observed　that　in　the　theories　of　our　time　various　errors　are　current　respecting　it；　which

pass　for　established　truths；　and　have　bee　fixed　prejudices。　We　will　mention　only　a　few　of

them；　giving　prominence　to　such　as　have　a　reference　to　the　object　of　our　history。　The　error　which

first　meets　us　is　the　direct　contradictory　of　our　principle　that　the　state　presents　the　realisation　of

Freedom；　the　opinion；　viz。；　that　man　is　free　by　nature；　but　that　in　society；　in　the　State　…　to　which

nevertheless　he　is　irresistibly　impelled　…　he　must　limit　this　natural　freedom。　That　man　is　free　by

Nature　is　quite　correct　in　one　sense；　viz。；　that　he　is　so　according　to　the　Idea　of　Humanity；　but　we

imply　thereby　that　lie　is　such　only　in　virtue　of　his　destiny　…　that　he　has　an　undeveloped　power　to

bee　such；　for　the　〃Nature〃　of　an　object　is　exactly　synonymous　with　its　〃Idea。〃　But　the　view　in

question　imports　more　than　this。　When　man　is　spoken　of　as　〃free　by　Nature；〃　the　mode　of　his

existence　as　well　as　his　destiny　is　implied。　His　merely　natural　and　primary　condition　is　intended。　In

this　sense　a　〃state　of　Nature〃　is　assumed　in　which　mankind　at　large　are　in　the　possession　of　their

natural　rights　with　the　unconstrained　exercise　and　enjoyment　of　their　freedom。　This　assumption　is

not　indeed　raised　to　the　dignity　of　the　historical　fact；　it　would　indeed　be　difficult；　were　the　attempt